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NOTES AND COMMENT
PARENT AND CHILD--Loco PARENTIS-EMANcIPATIoN-Decedent

had custody of plaintiff from the age of 10 to 22, thus standing in
relation of loco parentis to him; plaintiff suing administrator alleges
that because of work he had performed for decedent and others,
the proceeds of which decedent had kept, decedent owd him $1,500,
and that she had always promised him said amount. Plaintiff sought
to recover same from the estate. Held: Relation of loco parentis gave
decedent the same rights as actual parent to wages of child, that those
rights continued after the child attained his majority, the law not
presuming any change in existing relations from the mere fact that
the child has attained his majority, and that without agreement regarding earnings after majority the right to plaintiff's earnings remained
with the decedent. Sparks vs. Hinckley (Utah, 1931) 5 Pac. 2nd Series 570.
The case follows the practically undisputed rules that one standing
'in loco parentis' to another (standing as parent to one not his child)
the rights and liabilities arising out of the relation are the same as
between parent and child, and therefore entitled to the earnings of
the child until its emancipation. The decision, however, is interesting
in that it upholds a doctrine seldom called into use recently, namely,
that the law will not presume any change in existing relation of parent
and child from the mere fact that the child has attained his majority.
The court cites Brown vs. Ramsey, 29 N.J.L. 117, as authority. That
case held that attaining the age of 21 years is not ipso facto emancipation of a child from his or her father, although at that age the
child may emancipate himself by separation from his father. The
doctrine had been previously enunciated in Overseers of the Poor of
Alexandria vs. Overseers of the Poor of Bethlehem, 16 N.J.L. 119.
Minnesota approached this viewpoint in Thysell vs. McDonald, et al.,
134 Minn. 400 (Ann. Cases, 1917C, 1015) in which the court said
that a child remaining in the family after becoming of age is not
entitled to pay for services rendered unless the services were performed pursuant to a prior agreement for compensation therefor. The
same doctrine was repeated in Lovell vs. Beedle, 138 Minn. 12 (163
N.W. 778). The instant case, however, is believed to be the first to
squarely accept the holding of Brown vs. Ramsey.
ED HERMSEN.

EVIDENCE: PAROL EVIDENCE: CONTRAcT-Wheelwright v. Pure
Milk Association,__Wis.__240, N.W. 769. This is a case relating principally to the interpretation of a contract, and to the propriety of resorting to parol evidence for this purpose.
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The plaintiffs are producers of milk in the vicinity of Marshall,
Wisconsin, and were associated with the defendant, a co-operative association organized under the laws of the state of Illinois, having a
membership of about 20,000 producers.
The dispute arises over an alleged breach by the defendant of the
following contract: The member hereby constitutes the association his
sole and exclusive agent for the purpose of handling or marketing such
milk, together with milk delivered by other members signing similar
agreements and the association hereby agrees to market the milk in
such a way as it shall deem best for the advantage of all persons signing similar agreements.
The defendant contends this contract expressly constitutes the
association a selling agent, and thus undertakes to sell the principal's
milk to the best advantage of the principal. The plaintiff contends it is
a co-operative contract and clearly indicates an obligation to market all
milk together and for the advantage of all. Both parties contend the
contract is clear and unambiguous, however, the defendant further
argues that, assuming that the contract does not clearly mean what it
claims to mean, it is at least ambiguous and open to interpretation by
parol evidence.
The rule in Wisconsin with respect to hte admissibility of parol
evidence for the purpose of interpretation has been set forth in numerous cases. "If the contract is ambiguous, evidence of the surrounding
circumstances, practical construction by the parties, and even the
declarations of the parties constituting the negotiations may be resorted
to in aid of construction."'
In a concurring Wisconsin case the court said: "In answer to the
contention of counsel that testimony of the circumstances surrounding
and leading up to the making of a written contract are always admissable for the purpose of putting the court in the position of the parties
at the time of the contract was made, this court has said: 'Not so,
where there is no ambiguity in the contract, either in its literal sense,
or when it is applied to the subject there of, it must speak for itself,
entirely unaided by extrinsic matters. Where such ambiguity does exist,
then evidence of the circumstances under which the contract was made
is proper to enable the court, in the light thereof, to read the instrument in the sense the parties intended, if that can be done without
violence to the rules of language or of law. 2 Parties cannot use terms
with a fixed and certain meaning, and then disclaim such meaning.'
Mr. Williston in commenting upon this rule and cases holding the
'Firestone Tire & Rubber Co ., -Wis.--

236 N.W. 118.

2Johnson v. Pugh, 110 Wis. 162, 85 N.W. 641.
3 Zohrlaut

v. Mengelberg, 144 Wis. 564, 124 N.A. 247.

NOTES AND COMMENT

same rule states that the court in ddnying the admissibility of evidence
to cary an apparently clear writing, meant no more than that in the
particular case the evidence offered would not persuade any reasonable man that the writing meant anything other that the normal meaning of its words would indicate and that therefore it was useless to
hear the evidence. He goes on to say that whatever may be the propriety of admitting evidence of extrinsic facts where the meaning of
the instrument is apparently clear, there is no question that such evidence is admissible in every jurisdiction where there is no clear apparent meaning. It must be kept in mind, however, that the only purpose
for which such evidence is ever admissible in an action on the contract,
is to interpret the writing. So far as the evidence tends to show not
the meaning of the writing but an intention wholly unexpressed in the
4
writing, it is irrelevant.
It is probably accurate to say that the language of a contract is
ambiguous as applicable to the holding of the authorities, when it may
reasonably be taken in more than one sense. That is to say, the language must have some stretch in order to authorize the admission of
parol evidence without violating the rule against contradicting a writing
by parol. Likewise, the parol evidence must establish a sensee or meaning which the language of the contract will reasonably bear.
The court in the case in discussion concludes that the provisions of
the contract are ambiguous, that it hasn't a single clear meaning, and
htat either contention may be found in its language. Thus either party
is entitled to introduce parol evidence for the purpose of interpretation.
In regard to defendant's contention that the court erred in submitting the question of whether the contract was sufficiently ambiguous
to permit consideration of plaintiff's evidence to hte jury, the court
states: "that whether there is an ambiguity is for the court to determine, but where there is an ambiguity and resort to extrinsic evidence
is necessarw and proper, is for the jury."5
The dissenting opinion fails to appreciate the ambiguity, and contends that the contract is very clear, and plain-that it appears indisputably that the form of hte contract which is the subject of these
cases, was'o bring the members into a co-operative enterprise with the
purpose of controlling so far as possible the natural milk supply of
the city of Chicago. There is no question as to the treatment of the
members, or the obligation of the defendant. Thus t he contract is clear,
and ambiguous, and the introduction of parol evidence affecting the
meaning of a clear, and plain contract would work an injustice on the
parties.
BURTON E. FULMER
42 Williston, Contracts, p 1216.
5 Vilas v. Bundy 106 Wis. 168, 81

N.W. 812.

